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1Abstract
Intra-subsaharan African trade appears to be very low, an outcome that is
often attributed to the size of the exporting and the importing economies. If that
were the explanation, there would be no untapped trade potential. We argue
instead that the main determinants of this “missing trade” are geographical and
infrastructure-related impediments. Being landlocked and poor translates into
high trade costs. In this paper, we try to measure the impact of geographical
impediments on South-South trade. We focus on the intra and extra-regional
trade of the countries belonging to the West African Economic and Monetary
Union. We use an Armington-based model in order to evaluate the impact
of geographical and infrastructure-related impediments on bilateral trade ‡ows
within this region. We …nd two main results: paving all inter-state roads would
increase trade by a factor of 3, and crossing a transit country reduces intra-
bilateral trade ‡ows by 6%, ceteris paribus.
Keywords: South-South trade, landlocked, transport infrastructure, border
infrastructure
J.E.L classi…cation: F11, F15, O55
21 The Puzzle
“The road to hell is unpaved”, according to a journalist1 riding a beer truck
from Douala to Bertoua, two towns in Cameroon separated by less than 500
km. Indeed, “according to a rather optimistic schedule, it should have taken 20
hours, including overnight rest. It took four days. When the truck arrived, it
was carrying only two-thirds of its original load”. Hence, the role of decaying
roads and police harassment throughout the journey.
How geography and infrastructure a¤ect trade ‡ows among developing coun-
tries is not anecdotal. According to Sachs (2001) “since sea-navigable regions
are generally richer than landlocked regions, regions that are both temperate
and easily accessible to sea-based trade almost everywhere have achieved a very
high measure of economic development. Tropical and landlocked regions, by
contrast, are among the very poorest in the world”. Geographical patterns may
explain and keep up inequalities among nations: a glance at the world economy
points to developing landlocked countries loosely integrated to international
trade, as can be seen in Table 1 below.
Table 1: The disadvantage of landlocked countries
(unit: billion $ US, current value 2000)
Developing countries Developed
Africa Asia America Mideast countries
Landlocked Export 0.7 0.5 1.5 69.6
GDP 3.1 2.1 7.9 149.2
Export
GDP 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5
Non- Export 4.6 61.4 13.8 22.0 232.8
Landlocked GDP 13.22 141.5 66.6 54.7 1178.5
Export
GDP 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2
Sources: World Development Indicators 2000 and our calculations.
Landlocked developing countries are less involved in international trade than
landlocked developed countries.The export to GDP ratio for developing land-
locked countries is 20%, while for developed landlocked countries this ratio is
50% (2000). Turning to non-landlocked countries, the ratio is respectively 40%
and 20% for developing and developed countries.
But here, landlocking interfers with economic size; hence the need to sort
out these two impacts with a gravity-type methodology. The poor performance
of Southern countries is con…rmed by a gravity model on a sample of 84 de-
veloped and developing exporters (see the list in Table 14 and 15 in Annexes)
as can be seen in Table 7 in Annexes. Controlling distance, GDP, GDP per
capita, contiguity and common language variables, it appears that European
1The Economist print edition 2002.
3landlocked countries2 trade 30% less than other countries in the world, while
non-European landlocked countries trade 40% less. Besides, African countries
seem to face higher impediments to trade since estimation indicates that an
African country is trading 60% on average. Hence, land-locking and more gener-
ally geography have no straightforward impact on trade: the explanation might
be a combination of geography and other development-related determinants.
Another prominent evidence is the limited bene…ts of South-South trade
agreements so far (Greenaway & Milner, 1990); intra-regionaltrade (particularly
in subsaharan Africa) remains very low. In the West African Economic and
Monetary Union (WAEMU henceforth)3 for instance, the share of intra-regional
trade in total trade did not exceed 3% during the 1990s, despite an openness
rate of 70%.
These results show the tremendous weakness of South-South trade and raise
three issues that will be addressed in this paper:
1) What is the magnitude of untapped trade potential in the South?
2) What responsibility does geography4 bear?
3) Is the traditional gravity-type methodology a suitable econometric device
to sort out these e¤ects?
The di¢culty of the …rst issue is to …nd the best de…nition of trade poten-
tial. According to Havrylyshyn (1985) a country’s optimal level of trade in any
geographical direction is that which leads to the greatest gains in its economic
welfare. This is an interesting heuristic de…nition but generally, trade econo-
mists focus on residuals of a gravity model to assess trade potentials. Based
on the latter approach, Foroutan & Pritchett (1993) claim that there is no
untapped potential in subsaharan Africa intra-regional trade. Concerning the
second issue, Amjadi & Yeats (1995) …nd that the relatively low levelof subsaha-
ran African exports was essentially due to high transport costs 5. Between 1990
and 1991, the net freight and insurance bill of this region represented 15% of
the value of their exports, compared to less than 6% for all the developing coun-
tries. Limao & Venables (2000) suggest a signi…cant impact of transportation
infrastructure quality on transport costs and consequently, on trade ‡ows:poor
infrastructures account for 40% of predicted transport costs for coastal coun-
tries and 60% for landlocked countries. Concerning the third issue, Fontagné,
Pajot & Pasteels (2002)stress an heterogeneity problem: using a sample of de-
veloped and developing countries they …nd a strong non-linearity in the impact
of income per capita on trade, leading to biased elasticities in a sample obtained
with heterogeneous countries.
These quotations deserve credit for giving scienti…cally-based answers to
such contentious questions, but are missing an explicit model taking into ac-
2In our sample these countries are: Austria, Switzerland, Czech Republic and Hungary
3This Union consists of eight countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau,
Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo (See Figure 1).
4By geography, we mean physical geography as well as infrastructure endowments. See
Henderson, Shalizi & Venables (2001) for review of the literature and Limao & Venables
(2000) for an attempt at measuring the impact of infrastructure and geographical location of
a country on transport costs.
5They examine net freight and insurance payments from IMF balance of payment statistics.
4count the geographical and infrastructural features which seem to be sizeable
barriers to trade in subsaharan Africa. Addressing this issue properly should
permit quantifying the importance of geographical and infrastructural disad-
vantages. Against this background, this paper aims at assessing the importance
of subsaharan African (SSA) countries’ geographical and infrastructural disad-
vantages by focusing on their intra and extra regional trade ‡ows. We limit our
investigation to the WAEMU countries for which data on intra-regional trade
and infrastructure is available, but we include their trade ‡ows with OECD
countries in order to take their impressive openness rate into account.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Some stylised facts on
geographical and infrastructural disadvantages of the WAEMU are detailed in
section 2 and an Armington-based model for the determination of trade ‡ows
is developed in section 3. In section 4, we discuss the econometric issues raised
by the data we use. In section 5, we …rst estimate a traditional gravity model
for the sake of comparison and carry out product-speci…c estimations, then we
estimate the Armington-based model. The last section concludes.
2 Some stylised facts
The long experience in intra-regional cooperation in SSA makes WAEMU a
good case study to consider issues related to South-South trade. The WAEMU
was before 1994 a monetary union formed in 1963 to consolidate the common
currency used within French colonies. During the 1990s, the drastic economic
situation faced by these countries encouraged them to reinforce their solidarity
in a deeper economic integration. Whether this region is an optimal currency
area and how it may impact trade is not examined here (see Bénassy-Quéré and
Coupet , 2003).
Figure 1: The West African Economic and Monetary Union
5In the following, we will describe the geography of this union.
2.1 Road Infrastructures
The West African Economic and Monetary Union comprises …ve coastal (Benin,
Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Togo) and three landlocked (Burkina
Faso, Mali and Niger). More than three quarters of this area is located in the
Sahel and two coastal countries (Senegal and Guinea-Bissau) are located at a
distance from the other members (see Figure 1 above).
Roads is the main transportation infrastructure used for intra-regional trade
(more than 90%6). The road network of the Union is 146,352 km long with only
14% paved. This network is unevenly distributed among members and is inte-
grated in the whole West African roads network, which comprises three types
of roads: the coastal roads linking coastal countries, the corridors linking land-
locked countries to the sea, and the trans-sahel road from the border between
Niger and Chad to Senegal. The coastal countries, representing 20% of the
Union surface area, concentrate more than 70% of the Union roads. Table 2
below shows the road network distribution within the Union:
Table 2: Roads distribution throughout the WAEMU
Country Roads % paved Density
per 100 km2
BEN 13842 9 10.8
BFA 13117 14 6.7
CIV 68351 8 17.0
MLI 14776 17 2.0
NER 13800 25 2.7
SEN 14358 29 21.1
TGO 8108 20 28.4
Union 146352 14 5.9
Sources: WAEMU commission
Cote d’Ivoire concentrates about half of the whole Union road-network and
more than a quarter of paved roads, but Senegal has the second network with
a better percentage of pavement (nearly 30%). Togo has the smallest road
network but the highest road density (nearly 30 km of road per 100 km2). The
average road density of the Union is about 5.9 km per 100 km2 and only 14%
of the union road network is paved.
The Inter-State7 roads network is 13,202 km long, of which 80% are paved.
Nevertheless, the road linking Senegal to Mali is poorly paved (only 31% of
pavement), a situation that practically isolates Senegal and Guinea Bissau from
the other members of the Union in terms of land transport.
6Estimation of the transport department of WAEMU commission in 2001.
7That is highways between countries. Table 8 in Annexes gives a overview of these inter-
state roads.
62.2 Border Infrastructures
The Union members have signed two multilateral conventions8 to regulate and
facilitate road transport and transit across borders. Despite these arrangements,
limited border infrastructures might hinder the development of intra-regional
tra¢c.
A recent survey 9 funded by the WAEMU Commission provided information
on custom o¢ces (suitable or not, joined or not, adjacent or not), weighbridges,
radios, documentation on tax rate, typewriters, parking and stocking places.
To give an overview of these border infrastructure endowments of the Union,
a score combining all the information available on each border equipment can be
calculated. The method is rather crude: at a border, if the two customs o¢ces
possesses a given item of equipment or characteristic, the score is 2. If only one
has it, the score is 1, and 0 if no one possesses it. These scores then add up to
a percentage on a scale of border equipment, presented in Table 3 below:
Table 3: Border equipment and accessibility to some trading partners
Border Economic Distance Road % Borders
Centers (km) distance paved scores
CIV-BFA Abidjan-Ouagadougou 832 1,176 100 39
CIV-MLI Abidjan-Bamako 925 1,184 100 56
BEN-TGO Cotonou-Lomé 160 189 100 33
TGO-BFA Lome-Ouagadougou 757 970 100 44
MLI-SEN Bamako-Dakar 1044 1,486 31 22
BFA-NER Ouagadougou-Niamey 415 537 100 44
BFA-MLI Ouagadougou-Bamako 705 610 100 44
NER-BEN Niamey-Cotonou 785 1,041 100 33
Sources: WAEMU commission and our calculations.
On the basis of this scoring, it appears that only borders between Cote
d’Ivoire and Mali, Togo and Burkina Faso, Burkina Faso and Niger and Burk-
ina Faso and Mali are close to the 50% score. In addition, these countries are
connected with paved roads. Table 4 also reveals an additional source of re-
moteness (apart from geographical distances) of Senegal and Guinea-Bissau10
from the other members of the Union. Indeed, the score of the border between
Mali and Senegal is the lowest (22%), and in addition only 31%11 of the Senegal-
Mali inter-state road is paved, a fact that adds to the isolation of Senegal and
8Referring to the document “Etude sur la facilitation du transport et du transit routier
Inter-Etats” (1998), WAEMU Commission.
9“Rapport desynthèse préparatoireà latable ronde des bailleurs defonds sur les infrastruc-
tures et le transport routier des Etats membres de l’UEMOA” (2000), WAEMU Commission.
10Note that these twocountries are located at the far west of the Union (see Figure 1 above).
11Note for the sake of comparison that within the Union, 61% of the inter-state roads are
paved on average.
7Guinea-Bissau from the rest of the WAEMU countries. This border score is a
very useful variable but since we do not have an evaluation for all the borders
within the WAEMU, we cannot use it in the empirical estimations.
These facts on road and border infrastructure specify the geography of the
WAEMU. The extensive form of the union and low quality of the transport
infrastructure (few paved roads and poor border infrastructure) forebode high
inland trade costs and thus lower intra-regional trade ‡ows. In the following
section, we will build a bilateral trade model and focus on geographical disad-
vantages in order to analyse the intra and extra trade of these southern coun-
tries. The model is derived from the Armington assumption of country-speci…c
product and we obtain a structural model to be tested.
3 The model
Let us consider a two-region world: South and North. South represents a de-
veloping region (namely WAEMU countries) and North represents a developed
region ( namely OECD countries). We focus on the southern countries’ im-
port ‡ows from all the trading partners, that is WAEMU and OECD countries.
We thus consider South-South and South-North import ‡ows. Southern coun-
tries are denoted by i, i = 1;:::;I and Northern countries are denoted by k,
k = 1;:::;K. According to the Armington assumption goods are di¤erentiated
by their origin. We also assume that within each country j, there are Nj repre-
sentative …rms producing the country-speci…c good. We assume a constant and
non-unit elasticity of substitution between all the di¤erentiated goods.
Let consider a southern country i importing from the other southern and


















where mijs is the import of country i12 from …rm s in country j and ¾ is the
elasticity of substitution between the traded good. The consumer problem is
then to set his import for each di¤erentiated good so as to maximise this utility







12Summing this quantity over the Nj representative …rms yields Mij =
PNj
s=1mijs, the
total import of country i from country j. Here, we only focus on the import ‡ows Mij and do
not deal with the internal trade Mii since we aim at describing only bilateral southern trade
‡ows.
8where Yi is the income of the representative consumer in country i, Pij is the
price set by country j’s …rm in country i. Pij = Pj¿ij where Pj is the production
price and ¿ ij is an iceberg transport cost between countries i and j. This means
that a …rm producing in country j set a price Pj and the consumer in country
i bears this price but also the cost (expressed in term of the imported good)
required to ship this good from the production country to the import country.
We derive the …rst order conditions of the maximization problem and combine



















which indicates a gravity type relation: the import value of country i from
country j (PijMij) depends on the trade cost between these countries (¿ij), the
income of import country (Yi) and the production level of the export country
captured by the number of active …rms (Nj) and a price term including charac-
teristics of country j and those of the other trading partners (notice that ¸ is the
Lagrange multiplier). We can simplify this equation by re-expressing equation
(3) relative to a reference country, so as to cancel out the price term13. We use
here France as reference country because of its historical ties with West African
countries. This method will also correct any “colonization e¤ect” in WAEMU
imports from OECD countries.
















The left-hand side of equation (4) represents country i’s import from country
j relatively to country i’s import from France. The right-hand side represents
three determinants of the relative bilateral trade: the relative transport costs,
the relative production prices and the relative number of active …rms in export-
ing countries. Equation (4) is the structural equation we will estimate. The next
step is to de…ne relevant proxies for these determinants of the relative import
‡ows.
How can geographicalimpediments (captured by the relative transport costs)
be measured? Since we are dealing here with intra and extra regional trade,
geographical impediments toregionaland extra-regional trade ‡ows are speci…ed
as follows.
In the regional context, geographical impediments between two trading part-
ners separated by a transit country can be due to four factors:
i) a border factor (extra borders have to be crossed), which can be proxied
by the number of borders to be crossed by the shipped good;
13This method has been used by Head & Mayer (2000).
9ii) a distance factor which can be proxied by the road distance between the
two trading partners;
iii) a transit factor14, which can be approximated by the road distance from
the …rst border to the last border crossed by the imported good;
iv) an infrastructure factor, which can be estimated by the percentage of
paved roads between the two trading partners.





Border i , k  Border k , j 
Transit from j to i     
Import i from  j      
Figure 2: Measuring geographical impediments to intra-regional trade.
In extra-regional context, geographical impediments between a northern (j)
and a southern (i) trading partners can be evaluated as follows:
i) the extra-regional distance (to be crossed by the imported good before
reaching the developing region), which can be proxied by sea distance (SDij)
for a coastal importer i, and by an average sea distance over all the southern
coastal countries (±i) for a landlocked importer i;
ii) the inland distance (distance to be crossed by the imported good within
the developing region), which is zero for a coastal importer i and can be proxied
by the average road distance over all the southern coastal countries (·i) for a
landlocked importer i. 15
This computation for landlocked countries is justi…ed by the fact that we do
not know, from the database we use, which coastal country is used as transit
14For two contiguous southern countries, there is obviously no transit distance factor;
15using this average road distance to port but this remains statistically relevant. To recover
this dimension, we constructed an adjustedroad distance multiplying the average roaddistance
toport by a remoteness coe¢cient computed as the distance of a landlocked countrytoa given
OECD partner divided by its average distance to all his OECD partners, but this adjusted
variable yields non-signi…cant elasticities.
10country hence, so that a better way to randomise the transit country being to
use average distance over all the possible transit countries.
The following non-linear transport costs function takes the regional and the





ij £ Vij £ e"ij: (5)
SDij denotes sea distance between countries i and j, RDij denotes road
distance between countries i and j, "ij is a disturbance term taking into account
all unobservable sources of trade costs and Vij = 1 if the exporter country is an
OECD country. For southern exporters, the following speci…cation is adopted:
Vij = e






where FRENCH is a dummy variable specifying French speaking partners,
W AEMU is a dummy variable specifying intra-regional trade, %P Rij is the
percentage of paved bilateral road, TRAN SITij is the transit distance, that is
the distance from the …rst border to the last border to be crossed by a shipped
good and NBORDERij is the number of borders to be crossed.
This transport cost function suggests that transport costs are non-linearly
a¤ected by sea and road distances between the two trading partners, and also by
geographical and infrastructural characteristics of the importer located in the
South. To complete the analysis of the impact of geographical impediments on
trade ‡ows, and in order to account for non-linearities, we include the squared
variable %P Rij in estimations reported in Table 13 in the Annexes.
How can we measure the relative price and the relative number of active …rms
in exporting countries? Since we only need an aggregate price re‡ecting the
exporter production price, we use the GDP de‡ator (labelled as ¦ henceforth)





FRA. Introducing this factor allows trade elasticity with respect to
the price proxy to depend on data rather than being constrained to be equal
to unity. This variable is easy to get from the World Development Indicators
database and is relevant to approximate an aggregate production price. We
proxy the number of active …rms in an exporting country (a variable which
captures the production level of the exporter) by its GDP adjusted by a factor
'. Here again, the factor ' allows trade elasticity with respect to production
level not to be constrained to one. Since we focus here on aggregate import
and production ‡ows, it sounds relevant to use the aggregate production of a
country (its GDP) as a proxy the number of active …rms within this country.



































11The relative road distance16 can be simpli…ed as follows:










i where ·i is the average road distance to port de…ned
above,
















Finally, we have to estimate the following version of the structural equation
explaining relative bilateral imports by geographical, infrastructural, relative











+ (1 ¡ ¾)®2 ln
RDij
RDiFRA
+(1 ¡ ¾) ¯1FRENCH + (1 ¡ ¾)¯ 2W AEMU
+ (1 ¡ ¾) °1 ln %PRij + (1¡ ¾)°2 lnTRANSITij











In this equation, »ij = "ij ¡ "iF RA represents the error term taking into
account all the disturbance factors. In the following, we deal with econometric
issues raised by the empirical implementation of this model.
4 Econometric issues
Firstly, let us mention that we do not use panel data estimations since the
time span is short (three years) and the OLS with robust variance estimators
estimations yield similar results. In this section we address three econometric
issues relevant in our empirical estimations: missing dependent observations,
censored regressions and instrumental variables estimations.
4.1 Missing dependent observations
Since we use COMTRADE data for the estimations, one problem arises: only
four of the seven WAEMU countries17 are reporter countries at the UN trade
statistics. We can resort to mirror statistics when one of the trading partners
is a reporter, but there no mirror statistics for two non-reporter countries. How
can we deal with these missing dependent observations?
One approach is to simply ignore the missing observations. Since we have a
sample of 596 observations, this will yield consistent estimators. But the ignored
16For simplicity, we set by assumption RDiFRA = 1 and ViFRA = 1.
17Benin, Niger, Senegal and Togo.
12observations are useful since they concern South-South trade ‡ows this paper is
dealing with.
Another approach is to use the intra WAEMU intra-trade data to …ll in the
missing trade, but this yields a heterogeneity problem, since the observations of
these two databases are seemingly di¤erent. However, we can combine the two
data sources as follows: for the extra-regional trade ‡ows, we use COMTRADE
data and for the intra-regional trade we use WAEMU intra-trade data. We thus
have a complete data set usable for estimations.
We can also use an econometric device to bypass this problem by trying to
recover any helpful information from the incomplete COMTRADE database.
Many papers18 have addressed this topic of missing dependent observations.
Greene (1997) discusses this issue, starting from a general econometric model:
Y = X¯ + ²: (8)
In this model, data are partitioned into two subsets: nA complete observa-
tions and nB observations for which Y is missing. Let ^ YB be a predictor of YB






















Let bA be the least squares slope in a regression that uses only the observa-







= FbA + (1 ¡ F) bB:




AXA: This equation gives
a matrix weighted average of the two least squares estimators, and we have:
E(bf) = F¯ + (1 ¡ F) E(bB) : (10)
It appears that bf will be unbiased only if bB is unbiased as well. What is
the best estimate of ^ YB? Kelejian (1969) assessed the e¢ciency of the so-called
“…rst-order method” which uses ^ YB = XBbA, consisting in using the regressors
obtained with the complete sample nA to estimate ^ YB. This method passes the
test of unbiasedness and appears to increase e¢ciency, even if we must account
for the additional variation present in the predicted values.
To sum up, in the following empirical estimations, we use three sets of data:
18A…… and Elasho¤ (1996, 1967), Haitovsky (1968), Anderson (1957), and Kelejian (1969)
are a few of the major works.
13i) only COMTRADE data,
ii) COMTRADE data for extra-regional trade and WAEMU intra-trade data
for intra-regional trade,
iii) COMTRADE data and replace the missing dependent observations using
the …rst-order method described above.
4.2 Censored regressions
In the empirical part of the paper, we try to estimate the determinants of
product speci…c trade ‡ows. A common feature of statistics at this detailed
level is that low observations are set equal to zero. In the PC-TAS database
(using COMTRADE statistics), the trade value must be at least 50$. This is a
typical problem of censored observations and it is easy to prove that OLS are
no longer relevant.
Indeed, let us consider the following model to be estimated:
Y
¤ = X¯ + " (11)
for which we do not observe (Y ¤;X) but rather (Y;X) where:
Y = max (0 ; Y
¤): (12)
It is such that:
E (Y j X) = E(Y j X;Y = 0) ¢P (Y = 0 j X) + E (Y j X;Y > 0) ¢P (Y > 0 j X)
) E (Y j X) = fX¯ + E (" j " > ¡X¯)g ¢P (" > ¡X¯):
Since E[Y j X] is not a linear function of X, we cannot estimate ¯ by OLS.
One convenient way to solve such a model is to use maximum likelihood estima-
tion. In STATA, the estimation is straightforward using the TOBIT estimation
device. This is the way we estimate the product speci…c gravity model in Table
5, 9 and 10.
4.3 Instrumental variables estimation
The percentage of paved bilateral roads is designed to measure the quality of the
journey between two trading partners. This variable is endogenous in the sense
that trading partners with high GDP are likely to have more paved road and
thus a higher percentage of paved bilateral road. To correct this endogeneity
problem, we can use instrumental variable device. Empirically, adjusting the
percentage of paved bilateral roads appears to be relevant in the following way:
ln%P Rij = ®1 ln AREAi + ®2 lnAREAj + ®3 ln INFRAij + ºij (13)
where INFRAij is the total length of paved road within countries i and j
plus the lentgh of paved road between these two trading partners, AREAi and
AREAj being the surface area of countries i and j. The variable INFRAij is
14a measure of infrastructure quality between the two partners and re‡ects their
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+ (1 ¡ ¾) °1 ln %PRij + (1¡ ¾)°2 lnTRANSITij











ln %PRij = ®1 ln AREAi + ®2 ln AREAj + ®3 lnINF RAij + ºij
This is a triangular equation system which can be easily estimated by two-
stage least squares19. In the estimations, we use both OLS and two-stage least
squares for the sake of comparison.
5 Estimations and results
In this section we try to quantify the impact of geographical and infrastructural
disadvantages on the intra and extra regional trade of the WAEMU. Several
datasources are mobilised: COMTRADE statistics, bilateral and internal paved
roads from the WAEMU intra-trade and infrastructure statistics database20;
the World Development Indicators, providing many macroeconomics aggregates
and lastly geographical distance from the web site of Jon Haveman21. Since
foreign trade statistics are missing for Guinea-Bissau, the eighth country of the
WAEMU, we did not include this country in the sample. The time horizon is
the period 1996-1998.
In the following, we examine how relevant are geographical variables to ex-
plain the puzzle referred to above. We start by reconsidering the results of a
traditional gravity model, by sake of comparison. Then we proceed to the es-
timation of the Armington-based model we derived in section 3. The results
stress the importance of properly modeling geographic determinants; when the
proper speci…cation is adopted, the impact of geography on southern trade ‡ows
is con…rmed: among southern countries, it is worth paving road and reducing
transit costs.
5.1 The traditional gravity model estimations
Table 5 below sticks on the traditional gravity model and tries to assess the role
of the geographical variables in explaining the low level trade among WAEMU
19Note that since ºij and »ij are assumed to be independent and equation (13) does not
depend on the relative import ‡ows, the derivation is straightforward.
20Source of these data: WAEMU commission. The database speci…es clearly intra-WAEMU
trade ‡ows excluding any re-exportation ‡ows.
21www.haveman.org. Alternative distance measures are provided on the CEPII website
www.cepii.org.
15countries. The dependent variable of these estimations is the import22 of coun-
try i from country j (lnMij). The regressors are the sea distance between
countries i and j (ln SDij, which is 0 if country j is a WAEMU country), the
road distance between countries i and j (lnRDij, which is 0 if country i is a
coastal WAEMU country and country j an OECD country), a dummy vari-
able specifying wether country j is a French speaking country23 (F RENCH), a
dummy variable specifying the WAEMU intra-regional trade (W AEMU), the
GDP and GDP per capita of countries i and j (ln GDPi, ln GDPj, lnGDP PCi,
ln GDP PCj), the percentage of paved inter-state road between country i and
j (ln %PRij, for Paved Road between i and j), the transit distance between
country i and j (ln TRANSITij
24) and the number of borders to cross from
country i to j (NBORDERij).
We estimate di¤erent speci…cations organised in two ways:
i) according to the database used: speci…cations 1 and 4 use only COM-
TRADE data, speci…cations 2 and 5 use COMTRADE data for extra-regional
trade and WAEMU intra-trade data for intra-regional trade, speci…cations 3
and 6 use the database completed by the …rst-order method,
ii) according to the estimation method: speci…cations 1, 2 and 3 use OLS and
speci…cations 4, 5 and 6 use two-stage least squares to correct the endogeneity
problem of the percentage of paved bilateral road variable evoked above.
22Evaluated in current US $ value.
23We consider Switzerland, Belgium and Canada as French speaking countries.
24Note that this variable is set equal to 0 if countries i and j are contiguous. If they are not
contiguous, this variable is measured as the road distance from the …rst to the last border to
be crossed by the shipped good.
16Table 5: The traditional gravity model estimation
Dependant variable: lnMij
OLS with robust variance estimators
1 2 3 4 5 6
LnSDij -2.53¤¤¤ -2.53¤¤¤ -2.53¤¤¤ -2.54¤¤¤ -2.03¤¤¤ -2.54¤¤¤
(-10.70) (-10.68) (-10.68) (-10.74) (-8.09) (-10.73)
LnRDij -0.65¤¤ -0.65¤¤¤ -0.75¤¤¤ -0.96¤¤¤ -0.59¤¤¤ -0.97¤¤¤
(-2.56) (-3.65) (-4.14) (-3.32) (-2.86) (-4.93)
FRENCH 1.40¤¤¤ 1.40¤¤¤ 1.40¤¤¤ 1.39¤¤¤ -0.37 1.39¤¤¤
(9.10) (9.12) (9.13) (9.10) (-1.09) (9.11)
WAEMU -16.80¤¤¤ -16.81¤¤¤ -16.88¤¤¤ -17.20¤¤¤ -11.23¤¤¤ -17.21¤¤¤
(-7.48) (-7.71) (-7.74) (-7.63) (-4.78) (-7.88)
LnGDPi 0.84¤¤¤ 0.84¤¤¤ 0.85¤¤¤ 0.86¤¤¤ 0.83¤¤¤ 0.86¤¤¤
(6.01) (6.38) (6.39) (6.05) (5.25) (6.44)
LnGDPj 1.39¤¤¤ 1.39¤¤¤ 1.39¤¤¤ 1.40¤¤¤ 1.08¤¤¤ 1.40¤¤¤
(22.07) (22.39) (22.24) (22.29) (14.31) (22.59)
LnGDPPCi -0.90¤¤ -0.90¤¤¤ -0.91¤¤¤ -0.88¤¤ -0.35 -0.88¤¤
(-2.28) (-2.59) (-2.59) (-2.21) (-0.84) (-2.51)
LnGDPPCj 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.31¤¤¤ 0.01
(0.23) (0.22) (0.31) (0.19) (4.01) (0.19)
Ln%PRij 0.88¤¤ 0.88¤¤¤ 1.06¤¤¤ 1.43¤¤¤ 0.99¤¤¤ 1.44¤¤¤
(2.16) (3.02) (3.58) (2.96) (2.88) (4.34)
LnTRANSITij -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.16¤ -0.11
(-0.85) (-1.04) (-1.11) (-0.94) (-1.67) (-1.17)
NBORDERij 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.35 -0.08 0.36
(0.66) (0.91) (1.16) (1.07) (-0.26) (1.48)
CONST 11.95¤¤¤ 11.97¤¤¤ 11.89¤¤¤ 11.66¤¤¤ 4.74 11.65¤¤¤
(3.74) (4.08) (4.04) (3.64) (1.45) (3.97)
R2 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.41 0.58
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 596 640 640 596 640 640
¤¤¤represents a 99% level of signi…cance
¤¤ represents a 95% level of signi…cance
¤ represents a 90% level of signi…cance
The estimations are globally signi…cant, with R2 statistics greater than 40%.
The three …rst speci…cations are hardly di¤erent. The traditional gravity model
variables are signi…cant except for the GDP per capita of the exporter. A
doubling of sea distance induces a 80%25 reduction of imports of a coastal im-
porter. For a landlocked WAEMU country, we have to take into account the
inland distance crossed by the shipped good and thus a doubling of the total
25If we focus only on the sea distance variable, we have LnMij = ¡2:53lnSDij which
yields Mij = Dist
¡2:53




0:17Mij; hence about 80% of trade reduction.
17distance from an OECD country induces a 90% reduction of import ‡ows. The
dummy variables are also signi…cant and bear the expected sign: a common
language has a positive impact on trade ‡ows and the intra-regional trade of
the WAEMU countries is very low with regard to the extra-regional trade ‡ows.
Being a French-speaking exporter induces four times more import demand from
WAEMU countries. Since the Armington-based model is supposed to “…lter”
any “colonization e¤ect” of France, we will assess whether this result vanishes
or not.
These speci…cations are slightly di¤erent when we focus on geographical
variables: the data set using the …rst-order method to …ll in missing observations
shows that the percentage of paved bilateral road has a higher impact. It appears
that a 10% increase of this percentage induces a 11%26 increase in trade. The
other geographical variables are not statistically signi…cant.
The three following speci…cations (4, 5 and 6) instrument27 the percentage
of paved bilateral road with the surface of country i (and j if it is a WAEMU
country) and the total paved road in and between countries i and j. These
estimations provide two interesting results:
i) the impact of the percentage of paved bilateral road is higher,
ii) the transit distance makes for an additional impediment to trade.
Speci…cation 6 in Table 5 indicates that a 10% increase of paved bilateral
road induces a 15% increase in trade ‡ows and speci…cation 5 suggests that
transit distance accounts for 6% of trade cost28.
These estimations resulting from the traditional gravity model indicate a
statistically signi…cant e¤ect of the traditional gravity model variables with the
expected sign, except for the GDP per capita variable.
How these results are impacted by the nature of the shipped products is an
important outcome. The COMTRADE data provide 2-digit trade ‡ow statistics
and we can use these disaggregated bilateral imports as the dependent variables.
There are 99 2-digit product categories and for most of them, the import ‡ows of
WAEMU countries are very low, and cannot therefore yield robust estimations.
To bypass this problem, we group these products into 14 industries following
Fontagné, Freudenberg & Péridy (1997), as summarised in Table 9 in Annexes.
For these product-speci…c estimations, it is not realistic to use GDP de‡ator as
a price proxy. Besides, we do not …ll in the missing observations for the non-
reporter countries, because it would be too tricky to guess the speci…c products
they are supposed to exchange with each other. Thus we only perform a gravity
model based on the complete observations set (Table 10 and 11 in Annexes),
instead of estimating the Armington-based model we derived in section 3. We
26If wefocus only on the percentage of paved bilateralroad, we have LnMij = 1:06ln%PRij
which yields Mij = (%PRij)




27When we regress the instrumented variables on all the instruments, the F-statistics is
bigger than 10, which indicates that we do not have a “weak instruments” problem, as has
been shown by Staiger & Stock (1997).
28In this speci…cation, trade costs are due to sea distance (73%), road distance (21%) and
transit distance (6%).
18use a Tobit29 estimation to take into account the low trade values censured to
zero.
These disagreggated estimations are globally signi…cant except for Other
Transport Equipment industry. Focusing on the remaining 13 industries, the
estimations provide interesting results illustrating the importance of geogra-
phy in intra and extra WAEMU trade. The sea-distance reduction e¤ect is
unsurprisingly high for heavy products (Agriculture, forestry, mining...), while
the road distance parameter estimate seems to capture …rst of all patterns of
comparative advantages. The colonial ties seem to matter for non-agricultural
raw materials and machinery. The bilateral geographical variables do not yield
interesting results, except for the number of borders crossed by the shipped
Leather-Textile goods within the WAEMU. Since this industry is the most con-
cerned for intra-WAEMU trade, this last result seems to reveal that borders
hinder trade within the Union.
5.2 The Armington-based model estimations
In this section, we turn to the testable form of the theoretical model derived in
section 3, which is the main contribution of this paper. The dependent variable
is relative import as described in section 3 and the regressors are those included
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As in the gravity model estimations, the speci…cations are organised in two
ways:
i) according to the database used: speci…cations 1 and 4 use only COM-
TRADE data, speci…cations 2 and 5 use COMTRADE data for extra-regional
trade and WAEMU intra-trade data for intra-regional trade, speci…cations 3
and 6 use the database completed by the …rst-order method,
ii) according to estimation method: speci…cations 1, 2 and 3 use OLS and
speci…cations 4,5 and 6 use two-stage least squares to make up the endogeneity
problem of the variable percentage of paved bilateral road.
The results are reported in Table 6 below.




OLS and 2SLS with robust variance estimators
29See section 4.2 for theoretical justi…cation.
191 2 3 4 5 6
Ln
SDij
SDiFR -2.51¤¤¤ -2.52¤¤¤ -2.51¤¤¤ -2.50¤¤¤ -2.51¤¤¤ -2.50¤¤¤
(-10.77) (-10.79) (-10.80) (-10.78) (-10.79) (-10.80)
Ln
RDij
RDiFRA -0.64¤¤ -0.26 -0.64¤¤¤ -0.97¤¤¤ -0.53¤¤¤ -0.86¤¤¤
(-2.35) (-1.50) (-3.37) (-3.20) (-2.85) (-4.25)
Ln
¦j
¦FR -0.99¤¤¤ -0.71¤¤ -0.99¤¤¤ -1.03¤¤¤ -0.74¤¤¤ -1.01¤¤¤
(-3.18) (-2.55) (-3.23) (-3.26) (-2.64) (-3.29)
Ln
GDPj
GDPFRA 1.33¤¤¤ 1.37¤¤¤ 1.33¤¤¤ 1.34¤¤¤ 1.37¤¤¤ 1.33¤¤¤
(23.99) (24.85) (24.58) (24.05) (24.96) (24.61)
Ln%PRij 1.20¤¤¤ 0.65¤¤ 1.21¤¤¤ 1.78¤¤¤ 1.11¤¤¤ 1.59¤¤¤
(2.77) (2.22) (3.99) (3.49) (3.41) (4.59)
LnTRANSITij -0.18 -0.22¤¤ -0.18¤ -0.19 -0.23¤¤ -0.18¤
(-1.53) (-2.31) (-1.92) (-1.58) (-2.38) (-1.93)
NBORDERij 0.34 0.05 0.34 0.49 0.15 0.42¤
(1.08) (0.18) (1.49) (1.48) (0.50) (1.76)
FRENCH 1.08¤¤¤ 1.12¤¤¤ 1.08¤¤¤ 1.07¤¤¤ 1.11¤¤¤ 1.07¤¤¤
(5.84) (6.05) (5.84) (5.81) (6.03) (5.83)
WAEMU -17.28¤¤¤ -17.12¤¤¤ -17.28¤¤¤ -17.58¤¤¤ -17.33¤¤¤ -17.45¤¤¤
(-7.68) (-7.77) (-8.04) (-7.78) (-7.89) (-8.10)
CONST -1.54¤¤¤ -1.52¤¤¤ -1.54¤¤¤ -1.54¤¤¤ -1.52¤¤¤ -1.54¤¤¤
(-13.36) (-13.07) (-13.54) (-13.31) (-13.14) (-13.57)
R2 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.53
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 573 617 617 573 617 617
¤¤¤represents a 99% level of signi…cance
¤¤ represents a 95% level of signi…cance
¤ represents a 90% level of signi…cance
The estimations are globally signi…cant with R2 statistics greater than 50%
and the distance, GDP and WAEMU variables yield coe¢cients similar to those
from the traditional gravity model estimation. Here again, we do not detect
a weak instrument problem when performing speci…cations 4, 5 and 6. The
common language e¤ect decreases from four to three times more trade between
French speaking partners, indicating a correction of the French colonization
e¤ect over these developing countries. Here again, the border variables does not
yield signi…cant coe¢cients. In the following, we will focus on the relative price
variable, the percentage of paved bilateral road and the transit distance that
yield signi…cant and interesting results.
The …rst interesting result is the substitution e¤ect captured by the relative
GDP de‡ator ¦j=¦FRA. Indeed, speci…cation 6 indicates that if an exporter
price double relatively to price in France, the importer reduces its imports from
this country by 70%.
The second result is the positive return of paved bilateral road on trade
‡ows. This is the key variable measuring the quality of roads in this paper since
about 90% of the intra-regional trade is by roads. The positive and statistically
20signi…cant sign of the coe¢cient of this variable indicates that paving an extra
portion of a road between two trading partners increases their bilateral trade
‡ows. For the inter-state roads not totally paved, we can use the elasticity of
this variable to compute the extra import ‡ows created when the percentage
of pavement is completed to 100%. 30 In addition, we use the elasticity of the
variable percentage of paved bilateral road obtained with speci…cation 6 which is
econometrically more accurate because correcting for the endogeneity problem
of this variable and also using the so called “…rst-order method” to replace the
missing dependent observations. Not surprisingly, the results presented in Table
12 in Annexes indicate that the lower the percentage of paved bilateral road,
the higher the impact of this infrastructure improvement on the import ‡ows.
The trading partners most concerned are Mali and Senegal. Indeed, for the
year 1998, the simulations indicate that improving the inter-state road between
these partners from 31% to 100% paving can increase trade between them more
than three times. This seems to be a big issue for the Union, because Senegal
is the second most dynamic economy after Cote d’Ivoire, and its remoteness
from the other members tends to weaken the Union economy. Moreover, this
remoteness also a¤ects trade ‡ows between Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire. Indeed,
the simulations suggest that a 100% pavement of the road between these two
countries could double trade ‡ows between them. If we take into account all the
extra trade created by this “100% paving of inter-state roads” infrastructure
policy, trade ‡ows in this region are 2.87 times higher, a …gure that does make
sense if we recall that the intra-regional trade ‡ows for this Union was only of
3% during the 90s.
The third result is the additional cost due to transit distance measured by
the distance from the …rst to the last border to be crossed by the shipped good.
The negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ect of this variable con…rms the
idea that crossing a transit country yields extra trade costs independently from
the distance between exporting and importing country. Indeed, doubling this
variable induces 15% less trade which correspond to 6% of trade costs estmated
by the model, an e¤ect which adds to the traditional distance e¤ect. This
variable proves thus to be a good proxy for internal geographical impediments
of transit countries.
To complete this analysis, we also consider two additional factors (Table
13 in Annexes): export diversi…cation/concentration and non-linear impact of
paved bilateral road. First we analyse the impact of export concentration of
WAEMU countries on the low level of trade observed between them. Indeed,
if these countries export only agricultural raw materials dedicated to developed
countries, their bilateral trade will obviously be low.31 To assess such e¤ect, we
30claim an over-estimation of trade ‡ow when using this elasticity of the variable percentage
of paved bilateral road which takes intoaccount extraand intraregional trade ‡ows tosimulate
intra-regional trade ‡ows. However in the speci…cations, we include an intra-WAEMU trade
dummy variable which captures all e¤ects speci…c to intra but also extra trade. Thus, using
this elasticity for simulation is relevant.
31We are indebted to Sébastien Jean and Thierry ayer for suggesting such explanation
21add an her…ndhal sectorial concentration index of the most exported product of
each WAEMU country using ITC32 Trade Performance Index. The estimations
yield non statistically signi…cant coe¢cients for this variable indicating that
export concentration has no statistical impact on intra-WAMEU trade ‡ows.
Second, we explore a non-linear impact of the percentage of paved bilateral
roads on trade ‡ows using the term ln %PRij+(ln%P Rij)
2. The estimations
yields no statistically signi…cant coe¢cients indicating that introducing only the
variable ln %PRij like in Table 6 is a relevant way to assess the impact of this
variable on trade ‡ows.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we aimed at analyzing the impact of geography on South-South
trade, starting with the puzzle indicating a global disadvantage faced by land-
locked countries, and particularly developing ones. We focused on the integrated
countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union for which suitable
data for such an analysis is available.
The traditional gravity model estimates con…rmed the statistically signi…-
cant e¤ect of sea distance, road distance and GDP of the trading partners on
trade ‡ows. Being a French-speaking country induces four times more import
demand and increasing the percentage of paved bilateral road leads to higher
trade ‡ows. Shipping goods through a transit country also proves to yield
additional trade costs, accounting for 6% of the trade costs estimated in the
model. The industry-speci…c estimations provide interesting additional results,
two of them being most appealing. First, colonial ties seem to matter for non-
agricultural raw materials and machinery trade. Second, it appears that the
leather and textile industry which mainly concerns intra-regional trade faces a
strong border impediment revealing a weakness of the integration process.
The estimations from the Armington-based model provide three interesting
results and emphasize the role of geographical determinants. First, the paved
bilateral road return on trade ‡ows is con…rmed and reinforced. If all the inter-
state roads were paved, the countries would trade 2.87 times more than what
is observed. We can now answer to our initial question, as whether there is
an untapped South-South trade potential, given remoteness, economic size and
eventually landlocking of the countries in the region. The answer is yes, there
is an untapped potential for roads pavement projects. Second, transit distance
prove to be an additional impediment to trade, indicating that the internal
geography of the transit countries matters.
The main aim of this paper was to estimate to what extent geographical
disadvantages are a handicap for South-South trade. We focused on the West
African Economic and Monetary Union, but the results could be extended to
other southern regions. Two types of disadvantages seem to a¤ect these coun-
tries: one due to their location in a poor southern area and one due to the
higher impediments when crossing transit zones within this area. Beyond this
32International Trade Center UNCTAD/WTO, www.intracen.org.
22result, this paper proposes an alternative way of analysing the determinants
of trade ‡ows in southern areas by using an Armington-based model and spe-
ci…c de…nitions of geographical impediments. Applying such methodology to
other geographical areas, di¤erent databases and proxies of these geographical
impediments remains on the research agenda of trade economists.
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25ANNEXES
Table 7: The disadvantage of landlocked countries: a gravity model approach
Dependent variable: Ln(Export98ij)
TOBIT estimations
1 2 3 4 5
LnDISTij -1.21¤¤¤ -1.26¤¤¤ -1.24¤¤¤ -1.24¤¤¤ -1.23¤¤¤
(-29.18) (-30.25) (-29.38) (-29.38) (-29.31)
LnGDPi 1.16¤¤¤ 1.15¤¤¤ 1.15¤¤¤ 1.15¤¤¤ 1.16¤¤¤
(52.27) (52.34) (52.38) (52.35) (52.82)
LnGDPj 0.85¤¤¤ 0.83¤¤¤ 0.83¤¤¤ 0.83¤¤¤ 0.85¤¤¤
(41.47) (40.98) (41.01) (41.00) (42.14)
LnGDPPCi 0.24¤¤¤ 0.16¤¤¤ 0.17¤¤¤ 0.17¤¤¤ 0.17¤¤¤
(8.95) (5.73) (5.88) (-5.86) (5.89)
LnGDPPCj 0.16¤¤¤ 0.06¤¤ 0.07¤¤ 0.07¤¤ 0.07¤¤
(6.13) (2.21) (2.40) (2.38) (2.44)
CONTIGij 1.08¤¤¤ 0.89¤¤¤ 0.85¤¤¤ 0.88¤¤¤ 0.84¤¤¤
(5.19) (4.31) (4.09) (4.26) (4.08)
LANGij 0.85¤¤¤ 0.82¤¤¤ 0.82¤¤¤ 0.81¤¤¤ 0.84¤¤¤
(8.62) (8.40) (8.24) (8.29) (8.59)
1LLE -0.32¤¤¤ -0.40¤¤¤ -0.39¤¤¤ -0.39¤¤¤
(-2.78) (-3.46) (3.42) (-3.42)
1LLNE -0.50¤¤¤ -0.41¤¤¤ -0.42¤¤¤ -0.41¤¤¤
(-5.50) (-4.58) (-4.71) (-4.58)
2LLNE 1.15¤ 1.07¤
(1.81) (1.70)
1AFR -0.93¤¤¤ -0.93¤¤¤ -0.94¤¤¤ -0.95¤¤¤
(-12.75) (-12.79) (-12.81) (-12.96)
2AFR 0.16 0.18 0.20
(1.04) (1.20) (1.32)
CONST -6.26¤¤¤ -3.79¤¤¤ -4.01¤¤¤ -3.99¤¤¤ -4.47¤¤¤
(-13.90) (-7.84) (-7.85) (-7.81) (-8.84)
Pseudo-R2 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 7,825 7,825 7,825 7,825 7,825
¤¤¤represents a 99% level of signi…cance
¤¤ represents a 95% level of signi…cance
¤ represents a 90% level of signi…cance
Notes: DIST for geographical distance, GDPPC for GDP per capita, CONTIG
for contiguity, LANG for common langauge, 1LLE for one European landlocked part-
ner, 1LLNE for one non-European landlocked partner, 2LLNE for two non-European
landlocked partners, 1AFR for one African partnerand 2AFR for two African partners.
26Table 8: Bilateral paved road within WAEMU (in km)























Table 9: Aggregating the 2-digit products by industry
Industry 2-digits products label
AA 01-14 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry
AB 15-24 Food, Beverages, Tobacco
B 25-27 Mining, Quarrying, Oil
CD 28-40 Chemicals
E 44-49 Wood, Paper, Printing
FD 41-43, 50-67 Textile, Leather
G 68-72 Non-metallic mineral products
HI 73-83 Basic metals and Manufactured metal products
JA 84 Non-electrical machinery
JB 85 Electrical machinery
KA 87 Motor vehicles
KB 86, 88, 89 Other transport equipment
LA 90-92 Professional goods
N 93-99 Other industries
Source: Fontagné, Freudenberg and Péridy (1997)
27Table 10: TOBIT estimations of the bilateral imports by industry
Dependant variable: lnM Ind
ij
AA AB B CD E FD G
LnSDij -2.36 -4.60¤¤¤ -3.75¤¤¤ -1.27¤¤¤ -0.14 -0.19 -0.65
(-3.87) (-8.04) (-4.77) (-3.43) (-0.33) (-0.53) (-1.43)
LnRDij 0.03 0.36 0.54 0.05 0.93¤¤¤ -0.36 0.74¤
(0.06) (0.77) (0.87) (0.13) (2.61) (-1.03) (1.64)
FRENCH 0.14 -0.56 1.58¤¤ 0.20 0.23 0.29 1.40¤¤¤
(0.21) (-1.07) (2.15) (0.51) (0.61) (0.73) (2.79)
WAEMU -15.46¤¤¤ -31.93¤¤¤ -22.85¤¤¤ -8.75 3.19 6.06¤ -3.30
(-2.67) (-5.91) (-3.21) (-2.46) (0.81) (1.71) (-0.76)
LnGDPi 0.48¤¤¤ 0.32 0.93 1.86¤¤¤ 0.87¤ -0.29 1.29¤¤
(0.63) (0.50) (1.10) (3.86) (1.83) (-0.58) (2.25)
LnGDPj 1.07 0.76 -0.14 -0.25 -0.17 -1.10 0.09
(0.85) (0.73) (-0.11) (-0.33) (-0.22) (-1.44) (0.09)
LnGDPPCi 0.78¤¤¤ 0.98¤¤¤ 0.45¤¤ 0.84¤¤¤ 0.12 0.74¤¤¤ 0.29¤
(4.26) (6.38) (1.97) (6.67) (0.94) (5.81) (1.87)
LnGDPPCj 0.50¤¤ 0.23 0.53¤¤ 0.45¤¤¤ 0.69¤¤¤ 0.22 0.58¤¤¤
(2.30) (1.29) (2.01) (2.85) (3.81) (1.52) (3.34)
Ln%PRij 0.66 -0.71 -1.72¤ -0.39 -1.74¤¤¤ -0.38 -0.87
(0.84) (-0.91) (-1.93) (-0.69) (-3.49) (-0.68) (-1229)
LnTRANSITij -0.39 0.04 0.27 -0.04 0.09 0.57¤¤¤ -0.30
(-1.56) (0.17) (0.97) (-0.19) (0.54) (3.22) (-1.12)
NBORDERij -0.33 -0.97 -0.87 1.17¤¤ -0.79¤ -2.06¤¤¤ -0.26
(-0.43) (-1.43) (-1.10) (2.22) (-1.71) (-3.83) (-0.44)
CONST -4.88 24.76¤¤¤ 16.81¤¤¤ -5.83 -9.94 3.48 -2.03
(-0.51) (3.00) (1.55) (-0.96) (-1.56) (0.58) (-0.27)
Pseudo-R2 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.04
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 392 401 306 476 375 417 334
¤¤¤represents a 99% level of signi…cance
¤¤ represents a 95% level of signi…cance
¤ represents a 90% level of signi…cance
28Table 11: TOBIT estimations of the bilateral imports by industry (continued)
Dependant variable: lnM Ind
ij
HI JA JB KA KB LA N
LnSDij -1.48¤¤¤ -0.79¤¤¤ -0.24 -0.27 -0.26 -0.94¤¤¤ -1.04¤¤¤
(-3.41) (-2.88) (-0.78) (-0.79) (-0.21) (-2.93) (-2.63)
LnRDij -0.11 0.38 0.50 0.81¤ 4.98 -3.00 -0.24
(-0.26) (0.90) (1.37) (1.85) (0.63) (-0.30) (-0.35)
FRENCH 1.18¤¤¤ 0.84¤¤¤ 0.98¤¤¤ 1.10¤¤¤ 0.43 0.03 -0.20
(2.69) (2.79) (3.07) (3.23) (0.46) (-0.11) (-0.51)
WAEMU -9.41¤¤ -0.52 -0.90 0.03 - - -6.14
(-2.21) (-0.17) (-0.29) (0.01) - - (-1.55)
LnGDPi 1.63¤¤¤ 0.64¤ 0.62 0.90¤¤ 0.85 1.57¤¤¤ 0.42
(3.07) (1.65) (1.49) (2.01) (0.64) (3.39) (0.78)
LnGDPj -1.76¤¤ 1.06¤ 0.27 -0.73 1.65 0.04 -0.15
(-1.99) (1.65) (0.40) (-0.99) (0.64) (0.05) (-0.17)
LnGDPPCi 0.49¤¤¤ 0.82¤¤¤ 0.57¤¤¤ 0.73¤¤¤ 0.25 0.44¤¤¤ 0.82¤¤¤
(3.45) (8.80) (5.21) (6.25) (0.88) (4.18) (6.12)
LnGDPPCj 0.22 0.58¤¤¤ 0.35¤¤ 0.58¤¤¤ 0.45 0.34¤¤ 0.65¤¤¤
(1.40) (4.63) (2.44) (4.02) (0.86) (2.17) (3.36)
Ln%PRij -0.48 -1.13 -0.73 -1.16¤ 3.13 -4.22 1.08
(-0.78) (-1.60) (-1.34) (-1.79) (0.34) (-0.54) (0.97)
LnTRANSITij 0.38¤ 0.25 -0.15 -0.28 -6.70 5.36 -0.39
(1.86) (1.04) (-0.85) (-1.20) (-0.51) (0.38) (-1.30)
NBORDERij -0.36 -1.89¤¤¤ 0.43 -0.19 -4.10 -2.14 0.08
(-0.65) (-2.94) (0.92) (-0.24) (-0.57) (-0.35) (0.13)
CONST 11.61¤ -17.68¤¤¤ -12.74¤¤ 11.72¤¤¤ -14.42 -3.33 -6.60
(1.69) (-3.67) (-2.43) (-6.92) (-0.67) (-0.56) (-0.91)
Peseudo-R2 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.07
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.00
N 378 462 433 408 188 318 371
¤¤¤represents a 99% level of signi…cance
¤¤ represents a 95% level of signi…cance
¤ represents a 90% level of signi…cance
29Table 12: Extra 1998 import ‡ows when the % of paved bilateral roads is raised
to 10033 (units: 1,000$)
Country i Country j %PRij ¢Mij Mij
¢Mij
Mij (%)
BEN BFA 55 1,218 936 130
BEN SEN 69 6,247 8,745 71
BFA BEN 55 226 174 130
BFA SEN 57 4,033 3,362 120
CIV SEN 62 13,855 14,217 97
MLI NER 80 212 533 40
MLI SEN 31 105,290 29,751 354
NER MLI 80 1053 1,081 97
NER SEN 65 735 858 86
SEN BEN 69 103 144 71
SEN BFA 57 71 59 120
SEN CIV 62 23,932 24,558 97
SEN MLI 31 10,713 3,027 354
SEN NER 65 9 11 86
SEN TGO 68 89 119 75
TGO SEN 68 2,508 3,352 75
Total 170,293 90,927 187
Sources: WAEMU Commission and our calculations.
33In fact, we have ¢Mij = 1:59£
¢%PRij
%PRij £Mij, using the estimated coe¢cient of %PRij
in speci…cation 6 of Table 10 which is econometrically well speci…ed.




2SLS with robust variance estimators
1 2 3 4
Ln
SDij
SDiFR -2.50¤¤¤ -2.51¤¤¤ -2.52¤¤¤ -2.52¤¤¤
(-10.74) (-10.76) (-10.77) (-10.77)
Ln
RDij
RDiFRA -0.97¤¤¤ -0.36 -0.53¤¤¤ 0.40¤¤¤
(-3.19) (-0.41) (-2.87) (0.64)
Ln
¦j
¦FR -1.03¤¤¤ -1.03¤¤¤ -0.74¤¤¤ -0.73¤¤¤
(-3.26) (-3.25) (-2.64) (-2.61)
Ln
GDPj
GDPFRA 1.34¤¤¤ 1.34¤¤¤ 1.37¤¤¤ 1.38¤¤¤
(23.93) (23.53) (24.79) (24.98)
Ln%PRij 1.78¤¤¤ -2.20 1.14¤¤¤ -5.04




LnTRANSITij -0.18 -0.20 -0.24¤¤ -0.24¤¤
(-1.53) (-1.54) (-2.46) (-2.35)
NBORDERij 0.48 0.37 0.17 -0.06
(1.46) (1.03) (0.56) (-0.18)
LnHer…ndhal 0.03 0.03 -0.08 -0.08
(0.28) (0.25) (-0.86) (-0.81)
FRENCH 1.07¤¤¤ 1.07¤¤¤ 1.11¤¤¤ 1.11¤¤¤
(5.83) (5.91) (5.95) (7.56)
WAEMU -17.28¤¤¤ -17.34¤¤¤ -17.43¤¤¤ -16.94¤¤¤
(-7.66) (-7.60) (-7.85) (-7.56)
CONST -1.51¤¤¤ -1.50¤¤¤ -1.59¤¤¤ -1.58¤¤¤
(-11.03) (-10.84) (-11.56) (-11.36)
R2 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.51
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 573 573 573 573
¤¤¤represents a 99% level of signi…cance
¤¤ represents a 95% level of signi…cance
¤ represents a 90% level of signi…cance
Note: For all these speci…cations, ln%PRij is instrumented by ln areai, lnareaj
and lnINFRAij. Speci…cations 1 and 2 use only COMTRADE data and speci…ca-
tions 3 and 4 use COMTRADE data for extra-regional trade and WAEMU intra-trade
data for intra-regional trade. The non-linear term (ln %PRij)
2 is instrumented by
the same instruments than ln%PRij.
31Table 14: Exporters sample for the estimations in table 7
Code Country Code Country
ARG Argentina MDG Madagascar
AUS Australia MEX Mexico
AUT Austria MLI Mali
BAR Barbados MUS Mauritius
BEN Benin MYS Malaysia
BFA Burkina Faso NER Niger
BGD Bangladesh NGA Nigeria
BOL Bolivia NIC Nicaragua
BRA Brazil NLD Netherlands
CAN Canada NOR Norway
CHL Chile NPL Nepal
CIV Cote d’Ivoire NZL New Zealand
COL Colombia OMN Oman
CRI Costa Rica PAN Panama
CYP Cyprus PER Peru
CZE Czech Rp PHL Philippines
DEU Germany POL Poland
DNK Denmark KOR Korea Rp
DZA Algeria PRT Portugal
ECU Ecuador PRY Paraguay
EGY Egypt ROM Romania
ESP Spain RUS Russia
FIN Finland SAU Saudi Arabia
FRA France SDN Sudan
GBR UK SEN Senegal
GHA Ghana SGP Singapore
GHA Ghana SLV El Salvador
GMB Gambia SWE Sweden
GNB Guinea-Bissau TGO Togo
GRC Greece THA Thailand
GTM Guatemala TTO Trinidad Tbg
HKG Hong kong TUN Tunisia
HND Honduras TUR Turkey
HUN Hungary TZA Tanzania
ICE Iceland UGA Uganda
IDN Indonesia URY Uruguay
IND India USA USA
IRL Ireland VEN Venezuela
ISR Israel YUG Yugoslavia
ITA Italy ZAF South Africa
JOR Jordan MAR Morocco
JPN Japan
MAL Malta
32Table 15: Importers sample for the estimations in table 7
Code Country Code Country Code Country
AFG Afghanistan GHA Ghana OMN Oman
AGO Angola GIN Guinea PAK Pakistan
ARE Untd Arab Em GMB Gambia PAN Panama
ARG Argentina GNB Guinea-Bissau PER Peru
AUS Australia GRC Greece PHL Philippines
AUT Austria GTM Guatemala PNG Papua NG
BAH Bahamas GUY Guyana POL Poland
BAR Barbados HKG Hong kong KOR Korea Rp
BDI Burundi HND Honduras PRT Portugal
BEL Belgium-Lux HTI Haiti PRY Paraguay
BEN Benin HUN Hungary QAT Qatar
BFA Burkina Faso ICE Iceland REU Reunion
BGD Bangladesh IDN Indonesia ROM Romania
BGR Bulgaria IND India RUS Russia
BHA Bahrain IRL Ireland RWA Rwanda
BHU Bhutan IRN Iran SAU Saudi A
BLZ Belize IRQ Iraq SDN Sudan
BOL Bolivia ISR Israel SEN Senegal
BRA Brazil ITA Italy SEY Seychelles
CAF Central A R JAM Jamaica SGP Singapore
CAN Canada JOR Jordan SLE Sierra Leone
CHE Switzerland JPN Japan SLI Solomon I
CHL Chile KEN Kenya SLV El Salvador
CHN China KWT Kuwait SOM Somalia
CIV Cote d’Ivoire LAO Laos SUR Suriname
CMR Cameroon LBR Liberia SWE Sweden
COG Congo LKA Sri Lanka SYR Syrn A R
COL Colombia MAL Malta TCD Chad
COM Comoros MAR Morocco TGO Togo
CRI Costa Rica MDG Madagascar THA Thailand
CYP Cyprus MEX Mexico TTO Trinidad
CZE Czech Rp MLI Mali TUN Tunisia
DEU Germany MMR Myanmar TUR Turkey
DJI Djibouti MNG Mongolia TWN Taiwan
DNK Denmark MOZ Mozambique TZA Tanzania
DOM Dominican MRT Mauritania UGA Uganda
DZA Algeria MUS Mauritius URY Uruguay
ECU Ecuador MWI Malawi USA USA
EGY Egypt MYS Malaysia VEN Venezuela
ESP Spain NER Niger YEM Yemen
ETH Ethiopia NGA Nigeria YUG Yugoslavia
FIJ Fiji NIC Nicaragua ZAF South Africa
FIN Finland NLD Netherlands ZAR Congo D R
33FRA France NOR Norway ZMB Zambia
GAB Gabon NPL Nepal ZWE Zimbabwe
GBR UK NZL New Zealand
Table 16: OECD countries included in the database
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM-LUX
CANADA
CZECH REP
DENMARK
FINLAND
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREECE
HUNGARY
ICELAND
IRELAND
ITALY
JAPAN
KOREA REP.
MEXICO
NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND
NORWAY
POLAND
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZ.LIECHT
TURKEY
UNTD KINGDOM
USA
34